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Abstract 25 
This paper examines how to maximize contribution in public good dilemmas by 26 
arranging people into homogeneous or heterogeneous subgroups. Past studies on the effect 27 
of homogeneity of efficacy have exclusively manipulated group composition in their 28 
experimental designs, which might have imposed a limit on ecological validity because 29 
group membership may not be easily changed in reality. In this study, we maintained the 30 
same group composition but varied the subgroup composition. We developed a public good 31 
dilemmas paradigm in which participants were assigned to one of the four conditions (high- 32 
vs. low-efficacy; homogeneous vs. heterogeneous subgroup) to produce their endowments 33 
and then decide how much to contribute. We found that individuals in homogeneous and 34 
heterogeneous subgroups made a similar amount and proportion of contribution, which 35 
was due to the two mediating effects that counteracted each other, namely (a) perceived 36 
efficacy relative to subgroup and (b) expectation of contribution of other subgroup 37 
members. This paper demonstrates both the pros and cons of arranging people into 38 
homogeneous and heterogeneous subgroups of efficacy.  39 
 40 
Introduction 41 
Group composition affects cooperation in public goods dilemmas (PGD) [1, 2]. One 42 
way to characterize the group composition is group homogeneity and heterogeneity (or 43 
group diversity), which are defined as the degree of similarity and difference of attributes of 44 
group members respectively [3, 4]. Research on group homogeneity and heterogeneity can 45 
largely be classified into a social categorization perspective that examines how 46 
ingroup/outgroup differences may disrupt the group processes; and an information 47 
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perspective that stipulates how diversity in knowledge and expertise may facilitate group 48 
performance [5]. Past studies on organizational effectiveness have investigated the effects 49 
of group homogeneity and heterogeneity based on attributes ranging from surface level 50 
diversity (e.g., demographic characteristics of race, age, and gender) to deep level diversity 51 
(e.g., attitude, personality, and values) [6], and such group homogeneity and heterogeneity 52 
can have both positive and negative effects on organizational outcomes [7, 8]. This paper 53 
focuses on the effect of subgroup homogeneity in distribution of efficacy on contribution in 54 
social dilemmas.  55 
Suppose we have a 12-person work team with six high-efficacy and six low-efficacy 56 
members respectively, and they have to work on a specific task in a subgroup of three. How 57 
can we split the team in order to maximize their contributions? On the one hand, we can 58 
split the team into four homogeneous subgroups, with two subgroups each having three 59 
high-efficacy members; and the other two subgroups each having three low-efficacy 60 
members. On the other hand, we can also split the team into four heterogeneous 61 
subgroups, with two subgroups each having one high-efficacy member and two low-efficacy 62 
members; and the other two subgroups each having two high-efficacy members and one 63 
low-efficacy member. Although several experimental studies have investigated the effect of 64 
homogeneous distribution of efficacy on contribution in PGD, e.g., [9, 10], their findings may 65 
not be sufficient to address the above question, because these studies manipulated the 66 
group composition of efficacy such that the total number of high- and low-efficacy 67 
individuals (i.e., the “total” efficacy) in a group was changed. However, in our case, just like 68 
most situations in daily life, we are stuck with the people that we have. In such a 69 
circumstance, the only way to change group homogeneity is to divide the group members 70 
into subgroups. Therefore, it is important to examine by keeping the group members 71 
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unchanged, whether and how we can maximize group contribution by strategically changing 72 
the subgroup composition in organizations.  73 
We first introduce the concept of “efficacy” that will be referred to throughout this 74 
paper. We then summarize some past research about the relation between homogeneity of 75 
efficacy and contribution. After that, we highlight the distinctive features of the present 76 
study, and finally we propose two potential mediators that could help us understand the 77 
underlying mechanisms behind the aforementioned relation, namely perceived efficacy and 78 
expectation of contribution.   79 
Efficacy 80 
Efficacy, criticality, and indispensability are similar constructs that describe an 81 
individual’s impact on PG provision in a PGD, e.g., [11 - 15]. Particularly, Yu et al. [15] 82 
proposed that Efficacy = Endowment × Efficiency, in which endowment is the resource that 83 
a person can contribute while efficiency is the impact brought about by each unit of 84 
endowment. For example, in a group project, a person is considered to have high efficacy if 85 
he or she has much time available to devote to the group project (endowment) and can do a 86 
lot of work per hour spent (efficiency). Varying group size will affect the efficacy of 87 
individuals [16]. Keeping individuals’ endowment constant, as group size increases, the 88 
relative impact of each unit of endowment (efficiency) decreases, so as efficacy. In this 89 
study, we kept the “total” efficacy of the group unchanged, manipulating only the 90 
composition of efficacy of each subgroup.  91 
Homogeneity of efficacy and group contribution 92 
 Past studies examining the effect of group homogeneity of efficacy on contribution 93 
focused on endowment heterogeneity (also described as endowment asymmetry or 94 
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resource inequality by some researchers, e.g., [17, 18]). These findings, however, were 95 
rather mixed. On the one hand, Aquino et al. [17] found that high resource inequality led to 96 
less cooperation in social dilemmas. They argued that under high resource inequality, 97 
people with fewer resources tend to free ride because they perceive their contributions to 98 
be dispensable; while people with more resources also tend to free ride because they 99 
expect others to do so as well. Using a step-level paradigm with provision threshold, 100 
Rapoport and Suleiman [19] also concluded that heterogeneous groups were less successful 101 
in providing PG than homogeneous groups were. Similarly, Cherry et al. [20] showed that 102 
contribution levels were significantly lower when groups had heterogeneous rather than 103 
homogeneous endowments, irrespective of whether the endowments were determined by 104 
the performance of a task or were just randomly assigned. Fung and Au [10] also found that 105 
both the symmetrically heterogeneous and the hegemonic heterogeneous groups 106 
contributed less than homogeneous groups. Considering percentage contributions, 107 
Hargreaves Heap et al. [21] found that individuals with high endowment contributed 108 
proportionally less in heterogeneous groups than in homogeneous groups.  109 
 On the other hand, there has also been research showing that heterogeneous groups 110 
contributed more [9]. A study found that heterogeneity of endowment had a positive effect 111 
on aggregate contribution, but the effect was moderated by whether communication was 112 
allowed, whether participants received complete information about the payoff, and 113 
whether the marginal return was the same for each member [22]. Another study showed 114 
that in a best-shot PGD where the provision was determined by the highest contribution 115 
instead of sum of all contributions, endowment heterogeneity resulted in better 116 
coordination as it provided a shared expectation among group members [23].  117 
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Still, Warr [24] illustrated mathematically that the distribution of resources should 118 
have no effect on the contribution of PG. In line with this prediction, Levati et al. [25] found 119 
that homogeneous groups had similar contribution compared to heterogeneous groups. 120 
Table 1 shows the summary of these previous findings.  121 
 122 
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Table 1. Summary of studies of the effect of homogeneity of efficacy on contribution in public good dilemmas. 
Authors Year Sample 
size 
Group 
size 
Provision 
threshold 
Fixed/Continuous 
return 
Major findings 
Aquino et al. 1992 96 4 Yes Continuous Resource inequality led to decreased contribution. 
Chan et al. 1996 75 3 No Continuous Endowment heterogeneity increased contribution for high, but not 
low degree of heterogeneity. 
Chan et al. 1999 72 3 No Continuous Endowment heterogeneity increased aggregate contribution, but 
the effect was moderated by whether communication was allowed, 
whether participants received complete information about the 
payoff, and whether the marginal return was the same for each 
member. 
Cherry et al. 2005 124 4 No Continuous Contribution levels were significantly lower when groups had 
heterogeneous rather than homogeneous endowments, irrespective 
of whether the endowments were earned or randomly assigned. 
Cherry et al. 2013 192 4 No Continuous In a best-shot PG in which the provision level is determined by the 
highest contribution instead of the sum of all contributions, 
endowment heterogeneity resulted in better coordination.  
Fung & Au 
(Study 1) 
2014 96 3 No Continuous Both the symmetrically heterogeneous and the hegemonic 
heterogeneous groups contributed less than homogeneous groups. 
Hargreaves 
Heap et al. 
2016 210 3 No Continuous Individuals with high endowment contributed proportionally less in 
heterogeneous groups than in homogeneous groups. 
Levati et al. 2007 328 4 No Continuous No significant differences in contribution between homogeneous 
and heterogeneous groups. 
Rapoport & 
Suleiman 
1993 
 
60 5 Yes (vary across 
conditions) 
Fixed Heterogeneous groups were less successful in providing public 
goods than homogeneous groups were. 
 123 
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The present study 124 
In the present study, participants role-played a member in a work team of a social 125 
enterprise that consisted of six high-efficacy and six low-efficacy members. With the explicit 126 
knowledge of this group composition, each participant was either assigned into a three-127 
person homogeneous subgroup (i.e., either all high-efficacy or all low-efficacy members) or 128 
a three-person heterogeneous subgroup (i.e., either two high- and one low-efficacy 129 
members or two low- and one high-efficacy members). Participants were required to 130 
produce cell phone straps and decide how much to contribute to the social enterprise.  131 
There are two main objectives of the present study. The first objective is to see 132 
whether and how we can maximize contribution by strategically changing the subgroup 133 
compositions into either homogeneous subgroups or heterogeneous subgroups while 134 
keeping group members unchanged. Research to date that compared the effects of 135 
homogeneity and heterogeneity of efficacy on contribution has yielded conflicting findings. 136 
Notably, these studies cannot address our research question well because they focused on 137 
the effects with respect to groups instead of subgroups, e.g., [9, 17, 20]. The first distinction 138 
between past studies and our present study is that the former manipulated homogeneity of 139 
efficacy by changing the initial endowment of group members. In real life situations, say in 140 
an organization, we cannot always change the composition of group members at will. 141 
Consider again the 12-person work team with six high-efficacy and six low-efficacy members 142 
as an example. The team cannot be made a homogeneous team unless we dismiss half of 143 
the members. We can, however, split the initially heterogeneous team into several 144 
homogeneous subgroups given that task is divisible.  145 
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More importantly, the distinction between group and subgroup lies on the 146 
interdependence of task outcome [26]. For past studies comparing the contributions of 147 
homogeneous groups and heterogeneous groups, the PG was shared among people in their 148 
own homogeneous group or heterogeneous group only. In other words, a participant’s 149 
outcome is independent of the contributions of other groups. However, in our scenario, all 150 
subgroups are nested within the same group. Participants in all subgroups receive the same 151 
PG that is jointly determined by all members in the group, including members of other 152 
subgroups. Therefore, a participant’s outcome is dependent on the contributions of other 153 
subgroups as well.  154 
The second objective of the present study is to understand the underlying 155 
mechanisms that may explain how subgroup homogeneity can increase or decrease 156 
contribution. Specifically, we tested two potential mediators that are known to influence 157 
cooperation in social dilemmas, namely perceived efficacy of oneself and expectation of 158 
contribution towards others. 159 
 160 
Underlying mechanisms 161 
Perceived efficacy  162 
A person’s absolute efficacy may not be equal to one’s perceived efficacy.  We define 163 
absolute efficacy as the actual impact to the PG provision and perceived efficacy as the 164 
personal belief about one’s impact relative to the affiliated group or subgroup. For example, 165 
in a symmetric PGD with homogeneous endowment, the absolute efficacy of each individual 166 
increases when endowment increases, but the perceived efficacy relative to the group may 167 
not change because no one is comparatively more efficacious than the others. In the 168 
 9 
 
present study, we randomly assigned participants into either high or low absolute efficacy 169 
conditions. For simplicity, we use “high-efficacy individuals” and “low-efficacy individuals” 170 
to refer to the participants being assigned to high and low absolute efficacy conditions, 171 
respectively.  172 
Perceived efficacy has been shown to be effective in inducing cooperation through 173 
enhancing a sense of social responsibility [27]. Research under the rubrics of efficacy and 174 
criticality all pointed to the same conclusion that a person who perceives a larger impact on 175 
PG provision contributes more. Beyond the laboratory settings, perceived efficacy also 176 
impacts various kinds of organizational behaviors including job performance [28].  177 
Various factors can influence cooperation rate through efficacy. For example, a large 178 
group size decreases cooperation drastically because it diminishes one’s perceived efficacy 179 
[29]. Kerr [16] also demonstrated that people in a small group reported higher perceived 180 
efficacy and hence cooperated more than those in a large group, despite the fact that their 181 
impacts on the outcome were made objectively the same in both the small and large 182 
groups. 183 
While subgroup configuration does not affect the absolute efficacy of individuals, it 184 
does affect the perceived efficacy. Indeed, an individual’s perceived efficacy relative to the 185 
group may be different from that relative to the subgroup. Intuitively, subgroup 186 
configuration may not affect the perceived efficacy relative to the group, because 187 
individuals acknowledge that the efficacy levels of other members in the group remain the 188 
same, regardless of the subgroup composition. However, in terms of perceived efficacy 189 
relative to the subgroup, subgroup homogeneity matters. Among high-efficacy individuals, 190 
those in heterogeneous subgroups shall perceive higher efficacy relative to the subgroup 191 
than those in homogeneous subgroups, because they can make downward comparison with 192 
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low-efficacy individuals within the same subgroup. On the contrary, among low-efficacy 193 
individuals, those in homogeneous subgroups shall perceive higher efficacy than those in 194 
heterogeneous subgroups because in homogeneous subgroups everyone is of low-efficacy 195 
and there is no upward comparison. We thus predict an absolute efficacy ´ subgroup 196 
homogeneity interaction effect on perceived efficacy, and higher perceived efficacy relative 197 
to the subgroup will in turn lead to higher contribution. Specifically, we hypothesize that 198 
high efficacy individuals will perceive higher efficacy and will hence contribute more in 199 
heterogeneous subgroups than in homogenous subgroups, whereas low efficacy individuals 200 
will perceive higher efficacy and will hence contribute more in homogeneous subgroups 201 
than in heterogenous subgroups (Hypothesis 1).  202 
Expectation of contribution  203 
Expectation of contribution refers to the amount that one expects the other 204 
members to contribute. Expectation of others’ contributions does affect our own 205 
contribution. For instance, worrying that others are not going to contribute may induce fear 206 
of being a sucker. We may also develop a sense of greed to free ride on others if we think 207 
that others are going to contribute a lot [30, 31]. Furthermore, expectation of contribution 208 
was central to Pruitt and Kimmel’s Goal/Expectation Hypothesis [32], which stated that in 209 
addition to adopting a mutual goal of cooperation, developing mutual expectation of 210 
cooperation is essential in enhancing cooperation. Previous findings did support the 211 
Goal/Expectation Hypothesis that cooperation increases when we expect others to 212 
cooperate [33, 34].  213 
A person who possesses higher efficacy can potentially make a stronger impact on 214 
PG provision. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that a person with higher efficacy will 215 
contribute more. In terms of expectation of group contribution, because the group has a 216 
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fixed configuration (e.g., six high-efficacy and six low-efficacy members, as in the previous 217 
example), subgroup homogeneity should not affect the expectation of contribution towards 218 
the group. However, in terms of expectation of subgroup contribution, subgroup 219 
homogeneity matters. Among high-efficacy individuals, those in the homogeneous 220 
subgroups shall develop a higher expectation of subgroup contribution than those in the 221 
heterogeneous subgroups, because in high-efficacy homogeneous subgroups other 222 
members are also of high-efficacy. On the contrary, among low-efficacy individuals, those in 223 
the heterogeneous subgroups shall develop a higher expectation of subgroup contribution 224 
than those in the homogeneous subgroups, because in heterogeneous subgroups there are 225 
at least one other high-efficacy members who are supposed to contribute a lot. We thus 226 
predict an absolute efficacy ´ subgroup homogeneity interaction effect on expectation of 227 
subgroup contribution, and higher expectation of subgroup contribution will in turn lead to 228 
higher contribution. Specifically, we hypothesize that high efficacy individuals will expect 229 
other subgroup members to contribute more and in turn they themselves will also 230 
contribute more in homogenous subgroups than in heterogenous subgroups, whereas low 231 
efficacy individuals will expect other subgroup members to contribute more and in turn they 232 
themselves will also contribute more in heterogenous subgroups than in homogenous 233 
subgroups (Hypothesis 2).  234 
Taken together, we proposed a moderated mediation model in which subgroup 235 
homogeneity and individual efficacy interact to affect contribution through two pathways, 236 
namely perceived efficacy of oneself relative to subgroup and expectation of subgroup 237 
contribution towards others (Fig 1).  238 
 12 
 
 239 
Fig 1. Proposed moderated mediation model stipulating how subgroup homogeneity 240 
influences contribution. 241 
Method 242 
Participants 243 
 A total of 336 undergraduate students (63% female) participated in this study that 244 
was presented as an individual and group decision making experiment. Participants received 245 
a flat-rate of HK$50 (approximately US$6.5) for participation with a chance to earn an extra 246 
bonus according to their performance. The bonus ranged from HK$111 to HK$368 (US$14-247 
47) with an average of HK$215 (US$28). This study was approved by the Survey and 248 
Behavioural Research Ethics Committee of The Chinese University of Hong Kong. 249 
Design 250 
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The experiment embedded a 2 × 2 between-subject design with two levels of 251 
efficacy (high vs. low) and two levels of subgroup composition (homogenous vs. 252 
heterogeneous).  253 
Procedures 254 
 Six students participated in each session that lasted for around an hour. After 255 
participants have given their informed consent, the experimenter described the task 256 
scenario to them with visual aids. The PGD was presented as a social enterprise scenario. 257 
Participants role-played a member of a 12-person group in which their group members 258 
consisted of the participants from the present and the previous one session. Their business 259 
was to produce cell phone straps using plastic beads. The completed cell phone straps could 260 
be sold through either the participants’ own private stalls at a price of HK$5 per piece or the 261 
social enterprise at HK$15. The profit made by the social enterprise was a PG which would 262 
be shared equally among all 12 participants. The total payoff for each participant was 263 
calculated as the sum of the profits earned from the private stall and the social enterprise.  264 
Participants were then presented with four examples illustrating the characteristics 265 
of a PGD, such that everyone contributing a lot to the social enterprise is better than 266 
everyone contributing only a little; however, they could earn the most if they contribute 267 
only a little while others contribute a lot, and vice versa. The instructions stated clearly that 268 
there was no competition among participants and that there was also no competition 269 
between the social enterprise and private stalls. Participants’ first task was to manually 270 
produce these cell phone straps within a time limit. Their second task was to decide how 271 
many straps to sell through their own private stalls (non-contribution) and the social 272 
enterprise (contribution), respectively. 273 
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 The experimenter then demonstrated how to make the cell phone straps using 274 
beads—by inserting beads into a plastic strap and then bending the end of the strap to fix 275 
the beads. Participants were given one minute as a practice trial to make the cell phone 276 
straps and then to make an allocation decision. Participants were also given a calculator to 277 
compute the profits of themselves and other members based on a hypothetical scenario. 278 
The experimenter checked their answers to ensure that all of them understood the 279 
instructions clearly.  280 
 Afterwards, participants were told that just in everyday life, some people would 281 
have more time and they could work more efficiently. In order to simulate these individual 282 
differences, half of the 12 members in the social enterprise (i.e., the high-efficacy 283 
individuals) would be granted more time (six minutes) and higher working efficiency 284 
(requiring only three large beads to produce a strap); whereas the other six members (i.e., 285 
the low-efficacy individuals) would be granted less time (three minutes) and lower working 286 
efficiency (requiring six small beads to produce a strap) (Fig 2). S1 Appendix shows the 287 
instructions and illustrations of the task as presented to the participants. 288 
 289 
Fig 2. Example of the cell phone straps to be made by high-efficacy individuals and low-290 
efficacy individuals respectively. 291 
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The six participants in each experimental session that constituted half of the 12-292 
person social enterprise were assigned to two subgroups of three and were seated in two 293 
adjacent rooms. They were told that the 12-person group was put into two different 294 
sessions and each session was conducted in two separate rooms simply because of physical 295 
space constraints, in which we could not assemble a 12-person group at the same physical 296 
location simultaneously (cf. Tajfel’s minimal group paradigm [35]). Inside each room, the 297 
three participants were seated face-to-face but were three meters apart from each other, 298 
such that they could not see others’ responses on the questionnaires. However, they could 299 
notice whether the other participants were given six or three minutes to produce the straps, 300 
and whether they had large or small beads. Because low-efficacy individuals had only three 301 
minutes to produce the cell phone straps, they were asked to complete an English-to-302 
Chinese translation for a cell phone strap advertisement as a filler task while the high-303 
efficacy individuals were still producing the cell phone straps in the remaining three 304 
minutes. 305 
After participants had finished producing the cell phone straps within their allotted 306 
time, they completed a short questionnaire and allocated their straps to the social 307 
enterprise and their private stalls respectively by putting the straps into two separate 308 
compartments inside an opaque box that other people could not see their allocation 309 
decisions.  310 
After the game, participants completed questionnaires concerning their experiences 311 
regarding the game. Full debriefing on the game was given to the participants upon 312 
completion of all experimental procedures. In order to motivate participants to make the 313 
allocation decisions seriously, one out of six participants from each session was randomly 314 
selected to receive a bonus which was equal to his or her earning in the game. They were 315 
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told that the profit made by the social enterprise was calculated as the sum of the current 316 
and the previous session because the two sessions belonged to the same social enterprise. 317 
S2 Appendix describes how the bonus payments were computed. 318 
Manipulation of efficacy 319 
Efficacy was manipulated in terms of both endowment (amount of time granted to 320 
produce the cell phone straps) and efficiency (number of beads required to produce a strap) 321 
[15]. Participants were randomly assigned as either the low-efficacy or high-efficacy 322 
individuals. Low-efficacy individuals were given three minutes to produce the straps and six 323 
small beads were required to construct each strap; while high-efficacy individuals were 324 
given six minutes to produce the straps and each strap only required three large beads to 325 
construct.  326 
Manipulation of subgroup homogeneity 327 
  Although all social enterprises were identically comprised of six high-efficacy and six 328 
low-efficacy individuals, we systematically constructed subgroups of three people by 329 
assigning different numbers of high- and low-efficacy individuals to produce cell phone 330 
straps in separate rooms. There were two types of homogenous subgroups that consisted of 331 
either (a) three high-efficacy individuals or (b) three low-efficacy individuals; and two types 332 
of heterogeneous subgroups that consisted of either (a) two high- and one low-efficacy 333 
individuals or (b) one high- and two low-efficacy individuals. 334 
Psychological measures 335 
 After participants had finished making the cell phone straps, they reported their 336 
perceived efficacy and expectation of contribution before making the allocation decisions. 337 
Perceived efficacy 338 
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Participants’ perceived efficacy relative to the subgroup was measured by the item 339 
“Compared to other members in the room, please estimate the amount of straps that you 340 
have made”, and participants’ perceived efficacy relative to the group was measured by the 341 
item “Compared to the other 11 members in the social enterprise, please estimate the 342 
amount of straps that you have made” on a 9-point scale with 1 = “The least in the group” 343 
and 9 = “The most in the group”.  344 
Expectation of contribution 345 
Participants also estimated the number of straps to be contributed by the other two 346 
members in the same room (expectation of subgroup contribution) and the other 11 347 
members of the social enterprise (expectation of group contribution). 348 
 349 
Results 350 
Descriptive statistics 351 
 Table 2 shows the means and standard deviations of the number of straps produced, 352 
the number of straps contributed, and the proportion of straps contributed across different 353 
groups respectively. The average number of straps produced, average number of straps 354 
contributed, and average proportion of straps contributed by each individual were 23.3, 355 
10.0, and 42.4% respectively.  356 
  357 
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Table 2. Means (Standard deviations) of the number of straps produced and contributed, 
and the proportion of straps contributed across different subgroup homogeneity and 
efficacy conditions (N=336). 
 Subgroup Homogeneity 
Efficacy Homogeneous  Heterogeneous Overall 
    
Low (N = 87) (N = 81) (N = 168) 
Production 11.68 (1.63) 12.04 (1.56) 11.85 (1.60) 
Contribution 4.60 (3.55) 5.16 (3.55) 4.87 (3.55) 
Proportion 39.56% (30.20%) 43.05% (28.69%) 41.24% (29.45%) 
        
High (N = 87) (N = 81) (N = 168) 
Production 34.52 (3.72) 35.10 (4.31) 34.80 (4.02) 
Contribution 16.07 (9.17) 14.10 (10.20) 15.12 (9.70) 
Proportion 46.77% (26.56%) 39.89% (28.26%) 43.45% (27.53%) 
        
Overall (N = 174) (N = 162) (N = 336) 
Production 23.10 (11.81) 23.57 (12.01) 23.32 (11.89) 
Contribution 10.33 (9.01) 9.63 (8.83) 9.99 (8.92) 
Proportion 43.16% (28.59%) 41.47% (28.43%) 42.35% (28.48%) 
Note. “Production” indicates the mean number of straps produced. “Contribution” indicates 358 
the mean number of straps contributed. “Proportion” indicates the mean of individuals’ 359 
proportion of straps contributed. 360 
 361 
Effect of subgroup homogeneity on strap production and 362 
contribution 363 
 Before examining the effect of subgroup homogeneity on contribution, we tested 364 
whether the number of straps produced was different for individuals in homogeneous and 365 
heterogeneous subgroups. Welch’s t-test revealed that there was no significant difference 366 
in strap production, t(331.38) = -0.36, p = .72. In order to provide more convincing evidence 367 
that individuals in homogeneous subgroups produced a similar number of straps as 368 
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compared to that of heterogeneous subgroups, we followed the two one-sided tests (TOST) 369 
procedure proposed by Lakens [36] to conduct an equivalence test on strap production. We 370 
set the upper and lower equivalence bounds as Cohen’s d = ± .3. Power analysis showed 371 
that at least 145 participants per condition are required to achieve a power of .95 for this 372 
equivalence bound. Our sample size (N = 336) was adequate to perform this analysis. Using 373 
α = .05, the equivalence test was significant, t(331.38) = 2.39, p < .01, implying that the 374 
difference in strap production between homogeneous and heterogeneous subgroups was 375 
sufficiently close to zero to be considered practically equivalent [37].  376 
Next, we tested the effect of subgroup homogeneity on strap contribution to the PG. 377 
Welch’s t-test revealed that there was no significant difference in strap contribution, 378 
t(333.10) = 0.72, p = .47. In order to test whether homogeneous subgroups contributed a 379 
similar number of straps as compared to that of heterogeneous subgroups, we also 380 
conducted the same equivalence test on strap contribution. The equivalence test on strap 381 
contribution was significant, t(333.10) = -2.03, p = .02, implying that homogeneous and 382 
heterogeneous subgroups contributed similar number of straps. 383 
 We also tested the effect of subgroup homogeneity on the proportion of straps 384 
contributed to the PG. Welch’s t-test revealed that there was no significant difference in 385 
proportion of straps contributed, t(332.54) = 0.55, p = .59. The equivalence test on 386 
proportion of straps contributed was significant, t(332.54) = -2.21, p = .01, implying that 387 
homogeneous and heterogeneous subgroups contributed similar proportion of straps.  388 
 In sum, individuals in homogeneous and heterogeneous subgroups produced similar 389 
number of straps, and contributed similar number and proportion of straps to the PG.  390 
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Perceived efficacy and expectation of contribution as mediators 391 
 In order to test the proposed moderated mediation model stipulated in Fig 1, we 392 
performed a multilevel moderated mediation analysis [38] using Mplus 7.31 [39]. Multilevel 393 
modeling was employed because each low-efficacy or high-efficacy individual was nested 394 
within a homogeneous or heterogeneous subgroup. We assumed random effects in the 395 
model with efficacy as a level-1 predictor, subgroup homogeneity as a level-2 predictor, 396 
perceived efficacy relative to subgroup and expectation of subgroup contribution as two 397 
level-1 mediators, strap contribution as a level-1 dependent variable, and subgroup number 398 
as a cluster variable. The parameters in the model were estimated using maximum 399 
likelihood (ML). Three responses were excluded from this moderated mediation analysis 400 
because the participants did not indicate their expectation of subgroup contribution. S3 401 
Appendix shows the Mplus code of this analysis.  402 
Hypothesis 1 states that absolute efficacy moderates the effect of subgroup 403 
homogeneity on perceived efficacy, such that high-efficacy individuals in heterogeneous 404 
subgroups will have higher perceived efficacy than those in homogeneous subgroups; 405 
whereas low-efficacy individuals in homogeneous subgroups will have higher perceived 406 
efficacy than those in heterogeneous subgroups. Supporting Hypothesis 1, we found that 407 
the effect of subgroup homogeneity on perceived efficacy relative to subgroup was 408 
significantly different for high-efficacy and low-efficacy individuals, b = 3.19, p < .001, 95% CI 409 
[2.24, 4.13]. High-efficacy individuals in heterogeneous subgroups had higher perceived 410 
efficacy than those in homogeneous subgroups, b = 1.52, p < .001, 95% CI [0.93, 2.10]; low-411 
efficacy individuals in homogeneous subgroups had higher perceived efficacy than those in 412 
heterogeneous subgroups, b = -1.67, p < .001, 95% CI [-2.41, -0.94] (Fig 3). Hypothesis 1 413 
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further states that there would be a moderated mediation effect in which subgroup 414 
homogeneity and efficacy interact to affect perceived efficacy relative to subgroup, which in 415 
turn mediates the effect of subgroup homogeneity on contribution. For high-efficacy 416 
individuals, the conditional indirect effect of subgroup homogeneity on strap contribution 417 
through perceived efficacy as a mediator was significant, b = 1.13, p < .01, 95% CI [0.35, 418 
1.91], such that high-efficacy individuals in heterogeneous subgroups had higher perceived 419 
efficacy and hence contributed more straps. For low-efficacy individuals, the conditional 420 
indirect effect was also significant, b = -1.24, p = .01, 95% CI [-2.19, -0.30], such that low-421 
efficacy individuals in homogeneous subgroups had higher perceived efficacy and hence 422 
contributed more straps. The index of moderated mediation [40] was significant, b = 2.37, p 423 
< .01, 95% CI [0.79, 3.95]. These results supported Hypothesis 1 that perceived efficacy was 424 
a mediator of the effect of subgroup homogeneity on strap contribution, and that the 425 
mediating effects were in opposite directions for high-efficacy and low-efficacy individuals.  426 
 427 
Fig 3. Perceived efficacy relative to subgroup across different conditions. 428 
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Hypothesis 2 states that absolute efficacy moderates the effect of subgroup 429 
homogeneity on expectation of subgroup contribution, such that high-efficacy individuals in 430 
homogeneous subgroups will have a higher expectation of subgroup contribution than 431 
those in heterogeneous subgroups; whereas low-efficacy individuals in heterogeneous 432 
subgroups will have a higher expectation of subgroup contribution than those in 433 
homogeneous subgroups. Supporting Hypothesis 2, we found that the effect of subgroup 434 
homogeneity on expectation of subgroup contribution was significantly different for high-435 
efficacy and low-efficacy individuals, b = -21.76, p < .001, 95% CI [-27.30, -16.22]. High-436 
efficacy individuals in homogeneous subgroups had a higher expectation of subgroup 437 
contribution than those in heterogeneous subgroups, b = -12.83, p < .001, 95% CI [-16.98, -438 
8.69]; low-efficacy individuals in heterogeneous subgroups had a higher expectation of 439 
subgroup contribution than those in homogeneous subgroups, b = 8.92, p < .001, 95% CI 440 
[4.82, 13.03] (Fig 4). Hypothesis 2 further states that there would be a moderated mediation 441 
effect in which subgroup homogeneity and efficacy interact to affect expectation of 442 
subgroup contribution, which in turn mediates the effect of subgroup homogeneity on 443 
contribution. For high-efficacy individuals, the conditional indirect effect of subgroup 444 
homogeneity on strap contribution through expectation of subgroup contribution as a 445 
mediator was significant, b = -4.32, p < .001, 95% CI [-6.33, -2.31], such that high-efficacy 446 
individuals in homogeneous subgroups had higher expectation and hence contributed more 447 
straps. For low-efficacy individuals, the conditional indirect effect was also significant, b = 448 
3.00, p < .001, 95% CI [1.37, 4.64], such that low-efficacy individuals in heterogeneous 449 
subgroups had higher expectation and hence contributed more straps. The index of 450 
moderated mediation was significant, b = -7.33, p < .001, 95% CI [-10.31, -4.34]. These 451 
results supported Hypothesis 2 that the expectation of subgroup contribution was a 452 
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mediator of the effect of subgroup homogeneity on strap contribution, and that the 453 
mediating effects were in opposite directions for high-efficacy and low-efficacy individuals.   454 
 455 
Fig 4. Expectation of subgroup contribution across different conditions. 456 
As an exploratory analysis, we tested a similar moderated mediation model in which 457 
the two mediators (i.e., perceived efficacy relative to the subgroup and expectation of 458 
subgroup contribution) were substituted by perceived efficacy relative to the group and 459 
expectation of group contribution respectively. None of the moderated mediation effects 460 
were significant. These null results further demonstrated that it was the subgroup variables 461 
but not the group variables that affected the contributions to the group. 462 
 463 
Discussion 464 
 This study investigates whether we can maximize contribution through manipulating 465 
subgroup homogeneity in PGD that the whole group shared the same PG. Our results 466 
 24 
 
suggested that splitting groups members into homogeneous or heterogeneous subgroups 467 
can at the same time enhance and reduce contribution through two different mechanisms. 468 
Consider the high-efficacy individuals in homogeneous subgroups, they had lower perceived 469 
efficacy relative to subgroup than those in heterogeneous subgroups, which led them to 470 
contribute less. However, they had higher expectation of subgroup contribution than those 471 
in heterogeneous subgroups, which led them to contribute more. The effects of perceived 472 
efficacy and expectation of contribution hence counteracted each other and resulted in 473 
similar amounts of contribution for high-efficacy individuals. Similarly, among low-efficacy 474 
individuals, those in homogeneous subgroups had higher perceived efficacy, but lower 475 
expectation of contribution than those in heterogeneous subgroups. The effects of 476 
perceived efficacy and expectation of contribution again counteracted each other and 477 
resulted in similar amounts of contribution for low-efficacy individuals. The effects of 478 
perceived efficacy and expectation of cooperation that nullified each other may explain why 479 
homogeneous subgroups contributed a similar amount as heterogenous subgroups did.  480 
In an organization, it is common to divide workers into different subgroups to work 481 
on a specific task. Often, members of a subgroup have different levels of efficacy. Our 482 
results suggested that different strategies may be needed to motivate high- and low-efficacy 483 
workers to contribute to the organization. For high-efficacy workers, although they 484 
supposedly have high perceived efficacy, they may expect other low-efficacy workers to 485 
contribute only a little, making them reluctant to contribute more. Hence, interventions 486 
should focus on enhancing their expectation of contribution of other members, for instance, 487 
by trying to convince them that all members, regardless of their levels of efficacy, are 488 
equally willing to devote to the organization. For low-efficacy workers, although they may 489 
expect other workers to contribute a lot, they may not perceive themselves to be critical to 490 
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the organization. Hence, interventions should focus on increasing their perceived efficacy, 491 
for instance, by emphasizing their strengths and uniqueness so as to make them feel that 492 
they can have a critical impact on the organization.  493 
The negligible differences between groups composing of homogeneous subgroups 494 
and groups composing of heterogeneous subgroups should not be surprising or 495 
disappointing after all. Research in work group diversity has long been reporting mixed 496 
findings, e.g., [5, 41]. A social categorization or identity related perspective advocates that 497 
homogeneous groups are better because having members of similar characteristics 498 
promotes a positive affective state like stronger group identity, cohesiveness and trust. An 499 
information processing or decision-making perspective, however, advocates that 500 
heterogeneous groups are better because members with a diverse background promotes a 501 
positive cognitive state of differences in knowledge and expertise leading to higher quality 502 
decision making. Our work nicely demonstrated that how different emergent states like 503 
perceived efficacy and expectation of cooperation nullified the effects of each other as a 504 
result of the interaction between group diversity and member characteristics (i.e., subgroup 505 
configuration and absolute efficacy in the current study). 506 
In this experiment, participants made their contribution decision based on their 507 
number of straps produced. This effort task that required participants to manufacture cell 508 
phone straps in order to determine their endowment was similar to other public good 509 
experiments that examined the “house money effect” comparing endowments “given” by 510 
the experimenter versus endowments “earned” by the players. Some experiments 511 
determined endowments by asking participants to crack walnuts [42], answer Graduate 512 
Management Aptitude Test questions, e.g., [43], or stuff letters into envelops [44]. We 513 
anticipated that through random assignment of participants to experimental conditions, 514 
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heterogeneity in endowments (due to differences in ability in manufacturing cell phone 515 
straps) would be unsystematic random errors that affected both homogeneous and 516 
heterogenous subgroups similarly. We understand that this “earned endowment” 517 
manipulation adds another layer of heterogeneity. However, we believe that the 518 
heterogeneity arising from the “earned endowment” manipulation is not a confounding 519 
factor but instead it provides ecological validity that unlike other experiments in which 520 
endowments were fixed. Nonetheless, we addressed how the effect of subgroup 521 
homogeneity on strap contribution could be confounded by strap production. We examined 522 
and found that individuals in homogeneous subgroups produced similar number of straps as 523 
compared to those in heterogeneous subgroups. Furthermore, the effect of subgroup 524 
homogeneity on strap contribution remained non-significant even after controlling for strap 525 
production, F(1, 333) = 1.36, p = .24. We can therefore rule out the possibility that one type 526 
of subgroups may have produced more straps than another type of subgroups that have 527 
affected the strap contribution.   528 
Due to physical space limitations, we conducted each experimental session with six 529 
participants only instead of twelve participants, which was the group size of the social 530 
enterprise. However, we reiterated various times during the experiment that the social 531 
enterprise was comprised of 12 participants. In addition, written descriptions of the task 532 
scenario presented in a large font size posted on the wall, which also stated that their group 533 
consisted of six high-efficacy and six low-efficacy members, were clearly visible to the 534 
participants throughout the experiment. During the practice trial, we also asked participants 535 
to make estimates and computations regarding the other 11 participants in their group. We 536 
are confident that participants understood clearly that it was the 12-person group, but not 537 
the 3-person group in their room nor the 6-person group in that session, that shared the PG.  538 
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There are several limitations in our study. Our moderated mediation analysis 539 
identified perceived efficacy relative to subgroup and expectation of subgroup contribution 540 
as two mediator variables. However, we are aware that such a “measurement-of-541 
mediation” design does not imply causation between the mediators and the dependent 542 
variable [45]. Particularly, one may argue that the cause-and-effect relation between 543 
expectation of contribution and contribution may be unclear, because it is also possible that 544 
an individual who chooses to contribute a lot may be susceptible to a false consensus bias 545 
that others will also contribute a lot [46]. We attempted to minimize this effect by 546 
measuring the participants’ expectation before they made a decision on contribution. 547 
Furthermore, this effect presumably would not influence the interaction effects between 548 
efficacy and subgroup homogeneity, such that it should not have posed a significant impact 549 
on the validity of our results.  550 
While homogeneous groups are conceptually simple and unambiguous in the sense 551 
that all members have the same efficacy, our treatment of heterogeneity, however, could 552 
have been overly simplified. The concept of group heterogeneity is complex because there 553 
are numerous qualitatively different distributions of group composition.  Our 554 
heterogeneous subgroups belonged to the type of a “minority belief” distribution according 555 
to DeRue et al. [47]. It is difficult to assert how our findings may be generalized to other 556 
types of heterogeneous distributions, for instances, the bimodal distribution (equal number 557 
of high- and low-efficacy members), the fragmented distribution (all members having 558 
different efficacy [47]), or even a hegemony distribution [10]. Future research shall examine 559 
the robustness of our results across different subgroup compositions. 560 
Past findings about the effect of group homogeneity of efficacy on contribution have 561 
been mixed. Our study showed that perceived efficacy and expectation of contribution are 562 
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two mechanisms that can counteract the effect of homogeneity of efficacy on contribution. 563 
It is possible that certain factors in past experimental designs, including the presentation 564 
methods of PGD scenarios, the existence of a provision threshold, the group size and the 565 
payoff structure, etc., can make either the effect of perceived efficacy or expectation of 566 
contribution more salient, which in turn causes either the homogeneous or heterogeneous 567 
group to contribute more. Because past studies did not measure the perceived efficacy and 568 
expectation of contribution of the participants, future research can fill in the gap by 569 
investigating how these factors may influence the effect of homogeneity of efficacy on 570 
contribution and their respective mechanisms. 571 
While we are cautious not to over-generalize our findings theoretically and 572 
empirically because of our relatively narrow operationalization of group heterogeneity and 573 
the specific subgrouping manipulation that was based on isolation in physical space, our 574 
findings are useful in showing how subgrouping according to efficacy levels of individuals 575 
can have both advantageous and detrimental effects at the same time on contribution in 576 
mixed-motive situations.  577 
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